In analyzing specifically military themes, the principal reproaches have until recently tended to be social and political. The armed forces were attacked for narrowness, arrogance, and caste pride. They were dismissed as a romantic/aristocratic anachronism in an industrial/ democratic era 3 . Then in the aftermath of Vietnam, the United States Army discovered a treasure-trove of martial virtues allegedly nurtured between the Rhine and the Vistula. Suddenly the Germans emerged as a model of professional and technical efficiency, a particular source of lessons in waging conventional war against overwhelming material superiority 4 . Within months academicians began uttering caveats. Political scientists and historians who previously would have scorned to explore the ramifications of strategy or operations began producing learned works that focussed on the professional weaknesses of the German military. The soldiers and sailors, it seems, were not merely social obscurantists. They now emerge as technical incompetents as well, understanding no more of war than its details, ignoring the prophets in their own ranks. The German military is dismissed as lacking the vision to comprehend war's changing nature: the decline of the dynastic conflicts of the eighteenth century and the cabinet wars of the nineteenth in favor of mass, industrial war. Those few who understood what was happening refused to draw consequences. They feared to damage the fragile structure of their semi-modern society by preparing for the war they would have to fight. If Germany's modern history is characterized by an imbalance between reach and grasp, Germany's professional managers of violence stand convicted of sharing visions of conquest and empire without recognizing or willing the means to achieve the end 5 . Germany's own great theorist of war described the effect of true genius as manifested »not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole« 6 . In these terms, German planning seems to justify the sharpest condemnation. It is generally conceded that the German military could motivate soldiers, win battles, and orchestrate campaigns. At what Edward Luttwak calls war's theater level, they funcioned well 7 . But at the plane of grand strategy, involving the development and focussing of state resources for the optimal use of force as a factor in state politics, the Germans appear as children: »hopeless sergeants«, »a corps of postmen«. Frederick the Great's »genius for war« brought Prussia to the brink of destruction by 1763. Less than two centuries later his successors bettered that record. An increasing body of academic and military opinion argues that Hitler's war had no turning points because it had no plan. It was from start to finish a doomed effort against impos-ÏM sibly superior forces and resources 8 . Dreams of world power ended in total defeat: the 0 destruction of Prussia, the partition of Germany, and -not least -the loss of millions of the very lives the soldiers were sworn to protect. The author's thirteen-year-old daughter, preparing a term paper, summarized thousands of academic pages by saying »Germany kept starting wars, but somebody else kept finishing them«. Explanations of the German military's spectacular run of failures in fulfilling its ultimate responsibility increasingly focus on the soldiers' alleged tunnel vision. Germany's armed forces are presented as the embodiment of a belief that security depends essentially on the application of military power in a specific way. They ignored political, economic, and social aspects of strategy. They scoffed at any concept of a defensively-oriented approach, making offensive doctrines into a shibboleth. And they insisted, against all contrary evidence, that Germany could fight and win short wars against geometrically-stronger adversaries'. On one level this appears to be among those periodic rediscoveries of the wheel that galvanizes segments of the academic community. There is nothing intrinsically surprising about a state and its armed forces preferring to plan for, and win, short, decisive conflicts. For all its current mystique, la guerilla is ultimately a means of last resort, used by the weak and the desperate.
Nor is attrition likely to be an instrument of first choice for military professionals. The Red Army, to cite the most familiar example, bludgeoned the Wehrmacht into submission on the Eastern Front not from any commitment to the indomitable fighting spirit of the Russian proletariat, but from lack of any feasible alternative. Nor did North Vietnam complete its victory over the south as it began the war. Saigon fell not to a black-pajamaed insurgency, but to an armor-tipped blitzkrieg worthy of Zukhov or Patton.
Yet this critique of the German military is convincing and comforting. It fits the evidence. It also conforms to currently-favored academic stereotypes: the soldiers are not merely villains, but incompetents as well. Nevertheless, presenting Germany's armed forces as The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight generates an alternate problem. Since World War I western culture tends to interpret military institutions as uniquely incompetent, despite an overwhelming mass of evidence that incompetence is a norm of human behavior. Less overt, but no less common, is the argument from malevolence: the visceral assumption that military men and military organizations behave as they do out of positive and perverse delight in inflicting human suffering. From recruits abused in basic training to a nation led to destruction becomes a natural progression, if not exactly a logical one 10 .
Temporarily suspending the Argument from Incompetence and the argument from malevolence enables the development of a different perspective. The German military's approach to grand strategy, the German conception of war itself, differed in essence from the parameters currently seen as marking success in war. The German heritage, properly understood, is a heritage of total force applied in limited wars for limited objectives. The failure to comprehend this point reflects a tendency, particularly in the Anglo-American intellectual community, to equate limited war with limited force and -particularly since Vietnam -with open-ended commitments 11 . As will be seen in the following pages, German grand strategy kept these poles widely separated. However extreme Germany's use of means in a given situation, the ends remained limited, subject to negotiation. And the means themselves were calculated, at least in principle, to restrict the demands made on society as a whole.
I
German grand strategy was not a product of national unification. Its roots lay in the Prussian experience, and specifically in Prussia's ambiguous position in European power politics.
Geopolitically the state played two roles after 1648. On one hand Prussia was an archetype of the middle-ranking central European power, too large to be safely ignored, yet too small to pursue anything like an independent policy vis-a-vis Bourbon France or Habsburg Austria. On the other hand Prussia was also a Baltic power with two more or less equal rivals, Poland and Sweden. Pulled in two directions, the state had neither natural frontiers nor internal cohesion. It developed and survived as an artificial construction whose social and political relationships at all levels were based on rational calculation and quid pro quo·, service for service, obligation for obligation 12 .
These points must not become a defense of that geographic determinism which contributed so much to the Rankean/Borussian pieties of nineteenth-century German historiography. What they did instead was condition Prussia's development as a power state with a strategy and an ethic alike emphasizing limitations. In relating to her western neighbors, Prussia depended on what is best called a »risk army«: able to guarantee Prussia's integrity, and at the same time efficient enough to be attractive to the great powers and grand coalitions that dominated continental politics between 1648 and 1740. In the military context of the time, this meant a professional force ready to take the field on short notice. Militia systems, even in modified forms, had demonstrated their weaknesses too often during the Thirty Years' War to be marketable commodities. Nor did the developing Prussian social contract offer a climate favorable to militia service in the classic form 13 .
Under the Great Elector the Prussian army began as essentially a subsidy force. But instead of continuing this pattern and developing along the lines of Hannover or Electoral Hesse, the Prussian army evolved unter Frederick William I into a deterrent. The King and his principal ministers sought autonomy through autarky. Prussia was to be free of debt, independent of subsidies, with an army supporting this status by discouraging challengers without overstraining the state. It was a delicate balancing act, depending for success on avoiding internal or external disruption. By 1740 it had succeeded. A full treasury and an administration increasingly organized to support the military system weire the matrices of a disproportionately-large military establishment that depended for an increasing number of its rank and file on the cantonal system -an early form of selective service falling on the peasantry 14 . Prussia's gains remained modest and her aspirations limited: the title of Kingdom; some border rectifications in the north and east, principally the acquisition of Swedish Pomerania. This national strategy was a product of two interrelated factors. Prussia still lacked the strength to compete directly with her western neighbors, and the experience of Germany during the wars of Louis XIV showed all too clearly that gains made as concessions by the great powers were as easily revoked. Prussia was also able to profit by the fates of her eastern rivals. Poland's illusions of grandeur remained unmatched by any capacity for systematically mobilizing that state's power potential. On the surface, Sweden seemed a sharp contrast. Indeed, most of the techniques used in Prussia to create and sustain a disproportionately-large military establishment had been first developed across the Baltic. Yet within a century the House of Vasa had organized and conquered itself to exhaustion. By the death of Charles XII, Sweden's villages were as her treasury. Sweden, moreover, had acquired a reputation as an uncomfortable neighbor that could readily prove fatal to a state unable to withdraw behind geographic barriers 15 .
Well before Frederick the Great took the throne, then, the outlines of Prussian state strategy had emerged -a strategy of limited risks for limited gains. Frederick William I had attempted to cope, more or less successfully, with the objective threat Prussia's increasing strength posed to her neighbors by a broadly-conciliatory diplomacy. Two factors, however, made this an unviable strategy for his successor. First was the emergence of Russia on Prussia's flank as a power with European interests and limitless potential. Sweden and Poland had been on Brandenburg/Prussia's level; Russia represented a quantum escalation of probable threat. At the same time the traditional masters of European policy, France and Austria, were entering periods of decline. Decades of war had exhausted treasuries and administrations, burned out armed forces. Both great powers were, moreover, increasingly conscious of their own shortcomings. Growing domestic tensions were exacerbated by monarchs who seemed even to themselves to be a cut below their predecessors 16 .
Europe's apparent evolution towards a republic of states, all deserving representation as equal sovereign powers within a community of common values, created opportunities for Prussia. It also generated risks. If Charles VI and Maria Theresa did no more than toy with the concept of erasing Prussia from the map, neither Habsburg ruler was blind to the advantages of seeing Prussia safely put in her place as a second-rank state while time and opportunity remained 17 . Nor were Prussia's other western neighbors any more conciliatory. When in 1738 Prussia sought to renegotiate her position in the Rhenish duchies of Jülich-Berg, she was forced without ceremony to back down by a coalition of Austria, France, England, and Holland 18 .
For Crown Prince Frederick, this was a straw in the wind. Apart from his own self-image as warrior and statesman, Frederick saw it as a fatal necessity that Prussia must expand or face destruction. To follow current policies meant at best permanent client status, similar to Bavaria's. Yet the best evidence suggested Prussia was perceived as too strong to be allowed even that role. The alternative fate was Poland's: to be squeezed into vassalage and ultimately off the map. It must be remembered that Frederick was confident in the ultimate justice of his cause. Raison d'état is so often dismissed as the good sense of bastards that its original ideological nature is correspondingly overlooked. Frederick was as concerned of his rectitude as any twentieth-century revolutionary who sees an emerging new order threatened by powerful and reactionary neighbors. Even the vocabularies are similar.
Frederick's initial moves were cautious and conventional. He sought improved relations with France, encouraging her imperial aspirations while concentrating on the acquisition of the Austrian province of Silesia. His violation of the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 was not particularly unusual in itself. Since the Renaissance such documents had been little more than waste paper. But Frederick entertained no delusions of grandeur. Unlike its rivals and counterparts on the continent, Prussia had no imperial pretensions -no dreams of wealth from overseas colonies, no visions of being a Third Rome, no heritage of crusade against the heathen Turk. The closest Prussia came to such a legacy, the mythos of the Teutonic Knights, was a recent acquisition imperfectly assimilated. Prussia's essential interest, in the mind of her king, lay in securing her position at the gaming table 19 .
For Frederick, the best way of achieving this was by the application of force for limited ends.
The twenty-year Federkrieg between Hans Delbrück and the official historians of the Great General Staff has obscured a critical point. Frederick the Great was neither an »attritionist« nor an »annihilationist«. Both approaches tended to make war an abstraction, an end in itself, while for Frederick war was a means to an end. His study of military history and military art confirmed his belief that warfare, like any other human activity, could be controlled by talent and shaped by genius 20 . Yet at the same time Frederick was no pre-Romantic, seeing himself specifically blessed by Mars and Bellona. His concept of genius was pure eighteenthcentury in depending on an infinite capacity for taking pains. War might be the province of chaos, but careful preparation could limit the effects.
Such preparation was best applied at war's cutting edge: the battlefield. The craft of war in the eighteenth century was based on system and precision. In part this reflected a continued determination of Europe's absolute states not to risk a return to the horrors of the Thirty Years' War 21 . It was also a product of the increasing destructive power of modern weapons. In particular the rapid-firing flintlock musket created a battlefield environment demanding disciplined motivation at all levels. In the context of a single dominant weapons system, armies tended towards homogeneity. Military systems, moreover, were far less isolated than in later centuries. Doctrines and personnel circulated freely. Superiority correspondingly dependet on nuances: organization and administration, training and leadership 22 . Frederick was the first grand strategist to engage himself directly and systematically in these areas. War's nuts and bolts had historically been the province of the baseborn or the unimaginative. Frederick, on the other hand, recognized, perhaps more clearly than his nineteenth-century successors, that few plans survive direct contact with an enemy. This was all the more reason why that contact had to be the decisive one.
At least since the French and American Revolutions, it has become a virtual article of military faith, particularly in the English-speaking world, that armies reach the peak of their efficiency towards the end of a war. Cultural memories are dominated by the Union victory parade through Washington in 1865, by the final British offensive in the fall of 1918, by the worldstriding U.S. war machine of 1945. Any idea of a return to peacetime conditions as legitimate norms of efficiency is dismissed as the work of reactionaries anxious to return to »real soldiering« and forget the unpleasant lessons of combat 23 .
Frederick the Great saw Prussia's strategic needs as demanding an essentially different approach. In 1752 he declared that a commander's principal tasks were the same during peacetime: supervising the kleine Dienst of drill and administration, improving the officer corps, planning the next campaign. These responsibilities grew even heavier in the aftermath of a successful war. Constant example and tireless industry were needed to bring both the army and its supporting institutions back to peak levels of efficiency 24 .
Frederick sought the attainable rather than the ideal. He did not create new military forms, but rather developed those he inherited to their logical limits. A product of the Age of Reason, Frederick the Great believed it possible to forge an army like a samurai sword -a tempered instrument, to be drawn, used, and sheathed at the will of its master for the ends of the state 25 .
This attitude reflected his approach to war. For Frederick, as for his father, the Prussian army was ultimately a deterrent. His grand strategic concept in 1740 involved defeating Austria badly enough that she would not only make peace, but keep it rather than again risk trying conclusions with the Prussian army. European history for the next twenty years was shaped by the failure of that strategy. The failure of Frederick's strategy had operational roots in the failure of Prussia's army to defeat or to intimidate Austria decisively. In part this reflected the quantum improvement in the Habsburg armed forces within the conventional parameters of early modern warfare. Far from feeling that the First Silesian War represented Austria's optimal effort, Maria Theresa, her generals and ministers, proceeded to take up decades of slack -a process beyond Prussia's control. In its diplomatic aspects, Austrian grand strategy was able to confront Frederick by 1756 with a coalition of forces far superior to anything Prussia could hope to put in the field 26 .
Frederick consistently miscalculated Austrian intransigence -or, perhaps, Austrian irrationality. Maria Theresa and her diplomats responded to Prussia's challenge and Silesia's loss by initiating a revolution of their own: concluding an alliance with the House of Habsburg's traditional enemy, and sponsoring an ambitious and assertive Russia's entry into the European mainstream 27 . This assault on the European order to which Prussia sought admission was rendered even more effective because, like a new player in a long-running poker game, Prussia's diplomatic styles, strengths, and weaknesses were carefully scrutinized by the other players. Frederick's maneuverings gave him a reputation as too clever by half that was not fully deserved, but no less potent -particularly in the context of continental power relationships less and less susceptible to Prussia's direct influence. Mercantilist imperialism combined with Holland's replacement by France as the principal continental commercial power generated a broad spectrum of connections and hostilities beyond Prussia's grasp 28 .
Even with its Frederician improvements, the Prussian army could not sustain itself indefinitely against enemies similarly organized, equipped, and trained. Its carefully-honed edge could not survive the murderous casualties of flintlock battles. Its victories were not crowning mercies -not least because of Frederick's commitment to war as a rational process. The Prussian army's weakness in exploiting victory is commonly ascribed to its structure. Once out of direct control, its mercenaries and conscripts would allegedly have dissolved into a mob of deserters and plunderers. Frederick's own writings provide ample support of the argument. Yet the Prussian army's shortcomings in pursuit were also doctrinal. By the Seven Years' War its cavalry was disproportionately composed of native Prussians from the more prosperous elements of the peasantry. This arm's discipline in particular depended on motivation rather than brute force. That it remained undeveloped as an arm of exploitation in part reflected Frederick's belief in battle itself as the payoff, with victory establishing in the mind of a reasonable opponent the wisdom of negotiations as an alternative to further struggle 29 . When urged to launch a pursuit of the Austrians after Chotusitz in 1742, he answered: »I don't want to defeat them too badly.« 30 Ultimately he proved fortunate to survive. For Frederick, the near-disaster of the Seven Years' War only clarified the lessons of a quarter-century's fighting. Prussia's foreign policy must be based, even more than he had accepted in the first decades of his reign, on a policy of systematic negotiations for limited objectives. Should force be necessary to sustain those objectives, Prussia had to win her first battles decisively and convincingly. Prussia's internal structure remained suited to support a rapier, not a bludgeon -not least because of a social contract that increasingly stressed the state'p ability to protect its subjects from the direct impact of war. The growing rationalization ánd centralization of the economy and the administration after 1763 further contributed to! a frontloaded military system whose striking power significantly exceeded its durability 31 .
In the context of a limited foreign policy, the Prussian army proved successful in its deterrent role for three decades. It had proved such a formidable adversary that no one was particularly anxious to try conclusions again in the presence of any feasible alternative. 34 .
An increasing number of Prussia's military theorists turned to Republican France for an alternative model. The Revolution's armies seemed to combine the German Aufklärung's emphasis on Bildung, self-development, with the political metamorphosis of subjects into citizens. The Revolution's commanders appeared to respond to opportunities rather than doctrine. This flexible approach to warfare was the genesis of the military reform movement which rebuilt and reshaped the Prussian army after the collapse of 1806 35 . Its premises also challenged Prussia's historic approach to grand strategy. More than any of its counterparts, Prussia's reformed army stressed its populist image, building a century of myths around professors leading their students into battle and women assuming male disguise in order to free their land from an alien yoke. More than any of their counterparts during the Wars of Liberation, Prussian statesmen and Prussian generals stressed the necessity of waging a total war against Napoleon: fighting the French whenever and wherever possible, leaving postwar settlements to shape themselves 36 .
The implications of this approach to war were modified by two specifics. Militarily Prussia had become a Kleinstaat once more. Its territorial and economic losses after 1806 kept its reformed army small relative to its allies and its enemies. Its revised tactical doctrines placed correspondingly less emphasis on striking decisive, independent blows in battle. Prussia by 1813 was militarily better suited to coalition warfare than at any time since the days of Frederick William I. This fact in turn both shaped and reflected Prussia's role in a coalition held together by a negative common denominator: the defeat of Napoleon. Prussia could afford to take an extremist stand; her more powerful partners, with a more complex set of interests at stake, would ultimately assume responsibility for the postwar balance 37 The last point challenged much of the work of the military reformers. The Prussian army of 18,15 was in principle organized along Napoleonic lines: a mass army raised by conscription and depending neavily on popular enthusiasm for operational efficiency. The possessor of such a force risked inheriting France's position as an objective threat of Europe's order -a position Prussia had neither the will nor the capacity to sustain 40 . Such a force, even in the militia version advocated by such German liberals as Karl von Rotteck, was primarily credible as an ultimate weapon, and correspondingly vulnerable to pressures less than existencethreatening. It implied an ethic best applicable to total war for unlimited aims. Prussia's politics and geography, for their part, continued to indicate the value of a front-loaded military system best able to conduct specific operations for specific objectives.
The dichotomy was partly resolved by internal factors. The civic enthusiasm built into the reformed military system proved increasingly difficult to sustain in peacetime without a tangible enemy, a foe to legitimate sacrifices of time and energy. Prussia's state identity continued to depend heavily on an implied social contract stressing the instrumental and reciprocal nature of obligations. Prussian patriotism was based more on a rational calculation of benefits than on the white-hot intensity of its French counterpart. The reform of the feudal system in the countryside had removed many of the pragmatic advantages of military service. Biedermeier-era peasants were more likely to be the prey of market forces than the victims of oppressive landlords 41 .
This decline in enthusiasm was accompanied by a developing weapons technology that placed increasing demands on the combat soldier. Rifles were replacing muskets in the ranks of Europe's infantry. New designs of guns and new forms of ammunition enhanced the killing power even of smoothbore artillery. These tactical combat multipliers suggested that neither patriotic enthusiasm nor unthinking obedience by themselves were prerequisites of operational efficiency. The nineteenth-century soldier must be neither a zealot nor an automaton but rather a professional, combining basic commitment to his craft with precise skill in its details. This professionalism need not be confused with long service -at least in Prussia, whose budget difficulties made it impossible to pay for enough true volunteers for an army large enough to support the state's claim to great-power status. At the same time, however, it could not be replaced by unshaped enthusiasm 42 .
The new technology also made battles increasingly difficult to control in a Frederician sense. Armies were larger and killing zones were broader. From generals to corporals, soldiers must use judgment and initiative to survive. Victory was likely to involve the post facto tallying of results after a bitter dogfight lasting as long as several days. How were these facts best integrated into Prussia's grand strategic requirement of short, decisive wars? For the developing General Staff the answer involved not abandoning control, but shifting it to higher levels. Carl von Clauswitz's primary concern was to understand war as a phenomenon. If this involved establishing a philosophic idea of war as a thing in itself, it also resulted in accepting a dialectical relationship between the absolute and the real. True war was absolute violence.
Real war was at once less and more because it was part of the real world. Influenced by his inter-pretation of French successes, Clausewitz initially denied that limited aims might justify limited efforts. As his thoughts developed in the context of a successful professional career, he came to see the one-sided nature of »total war«. By the 1820's Clausewitz argued that limited conflicts were not merely a manifestation of »friction« -the inevitable grit in any machine run by humans. Limited war occurred instead because of the protagonists' intentions and wills. Far from being the modification of an ideal, limited war was as valid on its own terms as absolute war. And war's dual nature meant that each specific conflict must be shaped by its motives. Violence expressed diplomacy; it did not replace it. The famous cliché that war was the continuation of politics by other means therefore meant that strategy must be correspondingly political in nature 43 .
This theoretical concept of a grand strategy depending on control and limitation was translated into practice by Helmuth von Moltke. Like the Prussian General Staff as a whole, he was deeply concerned with retaming Bellona. Clausewitz wrote in the context of the Revolutionary/Napoleonic era, whose mass mobilizations had made armies into heavy, blunt instruments ultimately less able to achieve decisions than their Frederician forebears. Moltke believed decisive victories were still possible, particularly in a war's early stages. Systematic, comprehensive planning must be combined with utilizing technological multipliers at the strategic level, specifically the railroad and the telegraph. Improved coordination of logistics and command and enhanced strategic mobility were the preconditions of quick decisions in the context of limited war. And this was the only kind of war that made sense for Prussia.
Moltke's often-cited insistence that once war broke out its conduct must be determined by military considerations is best understood in the context of his conviction that Prussia's interests were no better served by prolonged conflict in 1866 or 1870 than in 1740. Like Clausewitz, Moltke accepted war as the province of confusion. He was concerned not with overcoming war's unpredictability but preventing it. The Prussian army best served Prussia's grand-strategic ends by winning its battles impressively enough to convince its foes to sue for peace. And at that point, by Moltke's own logic, the soldier could, indeed must, withdraw in favor of the statesman.
Initially the question of what constituted a decisive victory remained significantly vague in
Moltke's approach to warefare. Certainly in the aftermath of Königgrätz he was more concerned with destroying Austria's military power than with responding to Austria's peace overtures. This owed something to an outbreak of »victory disease« at royal headquarters. It owed even more to Moltke's recognition of just how near-run a victory Königgrätz had been. The Chief of Staff was more clearly aware than the Minister-President that ordinary operational competence can play a significant role in war's outcome, and that such competence was not a Prussian monopoly. A clearer indication of Moltke's developing emphasis on war's limits came in 1870. In all of his considerations of war against France, Moltke had feared a settlement in the pattern of 1866 was unlikely given France's revolutionary heritage and Napoleon's metaphysical ambitions. Once war broke out his anxieties were confirmed. The victories over the Imperial forces were total by any standards: one army hopelessly besieged in Metz, another surrendered at Sedan, and the Emperor himself in Prussian hands. But the North German Confederation bade fair to conquer itself to ruin, if not to death. Its victories were too dear. They left France without a government willing and able to negotiate peace on terms acceptable to Prussia 44 . French stubbornness was compounded by Prussia's demands for territorial compensation, specifically the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. This decision was less a product of nationalist and military intransigence than a manifestation of Bismarck's conviction. Otto von Bis-marck has been recently described as »the single most gifted politico-military strategist in modern history.« 45 The evaluation may be a bit hyperbolic, but even the Iron Chancellor's sharpest critics pay tribute to his acumen in advancing Prussia's immediate interests during the Wars of Unification. It is in this context that his perceptions of France must be evaluated. France, declared Bismarck shortly after Sedán, will not forgive us our victories no matter how generous our peace terms 46 . Bismarck saw basic French interests as demanding a weak central Europe -a status best achieved by playing north against south, the emerging German Empire against the equally-new state of Austria-Hungary. A policy of appeasement and conciliation directed towards Vienna was by itself no guarantee of preventing such a result. Bismarck was a good example of what John Gaddis calls an »asymmetrical strategist« 47 . He began with a basic concept of Prussia/Germany's irreducible interests, assessed threats to them, and developed means of preserving the interests against the threats. He concluded that France, unlike Austria, must be directly and permanently so weakened that any reasonable calculation would prevent her from trying to revise the results of 1870/71. The annexation of AlsaceLorraine, the heavy war indemnity, the psychic ascendance Bismarck sought over the emerging Third Republic -all were means to that specific end 48 .
The accuracy of Bismarck's assumption of an insurmountable Franco-German antagonism remains debatable. Less debatable is its effect on Bismarck's involvement in strategic planning after the collapse of the Second Empire at Sedan. With no significant French forces in the field Paris became by default the next strategic objective, despite the Prussian army's longstanding conventional wisdom that besieging the French capital was likely to prove a dead end. Significantly, however, it was Bismarck, the political leader, and War Minister Albrecht von Roon, a political general, who forced enlarging the scope of hostilities by bombarding Paris in the face of Moltke's opposition. The Chief of Staff's reasoning was a convenient, but no less reasonable, mixture of pragmatism and morality, On one hand, he argued, Paris was too big to be effectively attacked by the artillery at Prussia's disposal. On the other, a bombardment would expose Prussia to the kind of moral criticism her grand strategy could least afford 49 .
William I's ultimate support of his Chancellor strengthened Bismarck's control over the military, but did nothing to solve Prussia's strategic dilemma. The North German Confederation was too weak to capture Paris and deal simultaneously with the Third Republic's improvised armies and their accompanying partisans. By the spring of 1871 the new German Empire was less concerned with confirming its victory than with finding an exit from a situation creating an increasingly-complex, increasingly-threatening set of international and domestic problems 50 .
If a war fought under what everyone involved recognized as virtually ideal circumstances generated such difficulties, were there any feasible alternative approaches? Moltke's calls during the war's later stages for the complete destruction of France were more manifestations of his frustration than proposals for a national objective. The Second Empire's geostrategic position, sandwiched as she was between France and Russia, objectively worked against fighting any future wars to a conclusion of total victory 51 . Geography was reinforced by diplomacy. If Bismarck's Germany was a sated power, she was also the fulcrum of Europe. To cite only the most obvious example, Germany's increasing involvement in preserving the balance between Russia and Austria-Hungary reinforced a situation in which any protracted conflict ran the risk of becoming general -the kind of war most contrary to Germany's interests 52 . This risk was further exacerbated, in Moltke's mind, by the fear that cabinet wars were becoming obsolescent. Governments might initiate wars; increasingly, citizens sustained them.
For Moltke, the acquisition of political power by a greedy bourgeoisie and a feckless proletariat meant a corresponding decline in the rationality of grand strategy. Instead states behaved like novice gamblers, increasing the stakes after each loss in the hopes of recouping a limited original investment.
II
This situation was particularly risky for a Germany whose strength after 1871 often seemed to its policymakers more apparent than real. Nation building in a parliamentary system is at best no easy task. The Second Reich's mushrooming industrialization took place in the context of a socio-political structure that remained badly divided. The Empire had not been founded in adversity; Bismarck had not promised »blood, toil, tears and sweat«. No one could be quite certain how Germany's citizens would respond to the demands of total war. The men responsible for developing the new state's grand strategy were, moreover, conservatives in the Hegelian mold, seeing order as a norm and tension as a symptom of imminent collapse domestically as well as internationally 53 .
For Moltke the best practical alternative to the risks of people's war was prophylactic: averting the possibility by a combination of victory and negotiation. This principle lay behind his increasing advocacy of preventive war -a concept in Moltke's mind better expressed by the more modern term »preemptive strike«. Moltke did not see such conflicts with the eyes of a Tamerlane or a Hitler, as a means of totally destroying an unwary enemy. Instead he saw them as contributing to the front-loading of warfare in the interests of reaching quick decisions. Moltke's worst-case contingency, his plan for a two-front war against France and Russia, was based not on the sequential annihilation or crippling of Germany's enemies, but rather on the simultaneous bloodying of their noses, thereby establishing favorable conditions for the diplomats. Exploiting such victories in a military sense involved disproportionate risks. Paris was too strong; Russia too big 54 .
Moltke's increasing pessimism at the prospects even of preventive war increasingly led him to stress what later generations would caft deterrence. Any prudent government, the Chief of Staff declared, must hesitate to go to war under existing conditions. The next war could last for seven years, or for thirty, and »woe to him who sets Europe ablaze«. In such a context, a prudent national strategy involved avoiding war by massive military preparation -but preparation of a specific kind. Moltke's well-documented reluctance to expand Germany's armed forces to their potential numerical limits was only in part a manifestation of his fear of liberal officers and socialist enlisted men. For Moltke the general and increasing tendency to arms races in Europe ultimately meant that a larger German army would be faced by larger foreign armies, with no essential change in force ratios. This process, indeed, would represent a weakening of Germany's grand-strategic position by moving her armed forces in the direction of a heavy, blunt instrument able neither to keep potential enemies from waging wars nor to deal effective blows at war's outset. Germany needed instead to emphasize quality 55 . This did not mean reversion to a professional army, however attractive such a force might seem for domestic purposes 56 . The military technology of the late nineteenth century replicated that of the late sixteenth century in fostering mass. The individual soldier's efficiency was limited by physical factors -not least his growing bodily and emotional vulnerability to modern weapons. Conscripts, however, could be made into something more than patriotic cannon fodder in the French pattern, or a brute mass in the Russian style. Increasingly after 1871 the German army stressed the necessity of inculcating professional skills and techniques during the two or three years of active service. The dichotomy between the psychological and the technological battlefield, between quantity and quality, was essentially artificial in the context of Germany's strategic requirements. German strategists correspondingly stressed the need for fighting the kind of wars their army was best prepared to win: wars focussing on operational and tactical arts, emphasizing the initiative and forcing enemies already less skillful than the Germans further to enhance their shortcomings by reacting to German game plans. , The »cult of the offensive« in Imperial Germany was also a reflection of the military's internal dynamics. Like its counterparts elsewhere in Europe the Prussian/German army as it grew more bureaucratized favored a predictable environment, which would in turn be fostered by a strategy that set the tone of operations 57 . This predictability was of special importance to a force with significant problems of entropy. Emotionally as well as legally it is questionable whether there was in fact a German national army prior to 1916. Certainly the smaller state contingents were absorbed, leaving only details of uniform to mark their differences. Certainly the officer corps became more homogenized as old Prussians, new Prussians, and nonPrussians mixed cheek by jowl in the increasing number of new regiments. In contrast to his grandfather, William II deliberately fostered integration. A sergeant describing a group of clumsy recruits an »Oldenburg oxen« found himself in the same uncomfortable position as the U.S. officer under General Eisenhower who described his counterpart as »a British son-of-a-bitch«. Even the Bavarian contingent was by 1914 more distinguished by its lightblue uniforms than by any deeper idiosyncrasies of drill and doctrine 58 . Yet differences of spirit remained. This incomplete integration paradoxically fostered an increased emphasis on Prussianism. The military histories of the smaller contingents were seldom distinguished enough by themselves to establish a positive tone -and when they were, their victories had too often been won under French or Austrian command. In the Wars of Unification non-Prussian troops had usually been employed on secondary missions. The major exception, the Bavarian corps, had acquired an unsavory, if undeserved, reputation as better marauders than fighters. Aside from this an army that virtually doubled in size between 1871 and 1914 needed traditions and sought them in an »old Prussian« heritage that was more subjective than historical, more attitude than policy. This was a mind-set that encouraged affirming traditional positions, in contrast to the spirit of modernization. It also provided ready-made behavior patterns for officers drawn increasingly from first-and second-generation soldiers serving an army without the deep institutional roots of its British counterpart, an army that found itself more or less unexpectedly adopted as a focal point of national identity in a country where alternate symbols remained meager and shallow. The ersatz Prussianism of the Wilhelmine era had little enough to do with the Frederician era, but at least provided some sense of identity -not least in encouraging acceptance of the Frederician approach of decisive battles and limited wars 59 . The army's operational focus was further enhanced by the complexity of the requirement, alluded to earlier, of integrating the psychological and technical requirements demanded by modern battle. The process of changing the German officer corps from a social/political elite to a professional force of military specialists began years and decades before World War I, as the technical and moral demands of warfare increased. The heroic vitalism of the nineteenth century, itself in many ways a product of profound peace, stressed moral factors: will and determination 60 . Where previous generations of soldiers saw this mind-set as putting at risk Germany's limitëd-war strategy, after 1890 a rising generation of populist militarists saw it as a positive manifestation -as long as it was combined with professionalization depending partly on training, and partly on a select corps of leaders. The German army was remarkable for its essential insouciance even in the face of Social Democracy. Whatever peacetime threats the Marxists might propose, ran an argument common in regimental messes, a few victories would bring all but the blindest idologues around. Incompetent noncoms, declared the Prussian War Minister in 1908, brought more men to socialism than the party's professional agitators -a point by no means indefensible in an environment where Social Democratic trade unions regularly threw parties for their members departing for their terms of active service 61 . The army's challenge lay less in propagandizing its rank and file than in teaching them how to survive and win against modern firepower and the heavy losses it inevitably meant. The propensity of soldiers to focus on detail is more than a simple-minded love for shining brass or elaborate hardware, and more than narrow-minded rejection of anything beyond nuts and bolts. The importance of professional competence in implementing grand strategy is too easily overlooked. Still another distraction from questions of grand strategy was provided by the German navy. The army's continental, technical orientation had no place for Weltpolitik. Germany's emerging fleet, on the other hand, exemplified a force that would at once be an instrument of national integration and a means of Germany's emergence as a global power. The army was uncomfortable with one role and rejected the other. The navy fulfilled both badly. For all the rhetoric of the various navy leagues and colonial associations, the fleet never became more than a secondarily popular institution, acceptable in direct ratio to its cost 63 . It remained a junior service, without the deep popular roots sunk by the army's conscription. From Tirpitz and the Kaiser downwards, no one was quite sure whether the navy was in fact a step to global power or a limited instrument in the Prussian tradition. Unlike the army which always knew its mission, the navy was torn between advocates of a flag-showing jeune école and supporters of a battle fleet. Should operational plans be concentrated against France and Russia, or against a rapidly-emerging British Grand Fleet? After 1905 even such basic strategic questions became essentially dead letters. The German navy was in no way strong enough to wage war against the Triple Entente. Its war plans and war games were based on such increasingly-unlikely contingencies that the Kaiser had to be periodically warned that a risk navy was different in essence from a suicide force. In response, like the army, the navy became increasingly involved in tactical and technical details, with everyone more or less hoping for a miracle once the shooting started 64 .
At the same time Germany's emphasis on offensive opereations were part of a well-rooted perception of national requirements that were not the products of internal institutional factors. Successful military offensives, whether by land or sea, were only half of any grand-strategic equation. The other half, accepted by Moltke as well as Bismarck, was negotiation with a defeated enemy from a common structure of interests. Prussia's strategy had depended historically on systematic coordination between military and political elements. Germany was not merely Prussia written large. Her strategic requirements, however, remained essentially similar. The General Staff's continued recognition that victory was a dialectical product of the interplay between force and politics put a correspondingly massive burden on Germany's statemen. They were expected to create and sustain the preconditions for the short wars the military saw as necessary not for an optimal, but a successful national grand strategy. The diplomats for their part accepted these parameters -indeed, they welcomed them. From his first months in power Bismarck was concerned with limiting the army's direct involvement in politics, an involvement that during the Prussian constitutional crisis of the 1850's had made the army more of a state within a state than it would ever be again. The Chancellor worked consistently and successfully to exclude the soldiers from direct participation in policymaking and, when that was not possible, to limit their involvement. He nurtured and exacerbated internal conflicts among the War Ministry, the Military Cabinet, and the General Staff. He encouraged focussing on the professional, cutting edge of the military's spectrum of responsibilities -an attitude already fostered by Moltke's insistence on the separation of military and political spheres of action 65 .
Such an approach to strategy is likely to be most effective in the context of what Jack Snyder calls a unitary political system, a system dominated by a single ruler or a ruling group with common interests and outlooks. The players in such a system have the largest single stake in the system's survival 66 . As much to the point, they are also likely to have a certain sense of moral responsibility to that system. This was particularly true in Prussia, where Frederick the Great's aphoristic definition of himself as »the Field Marshal and First Minister of the King of Prussia« did much to shape at least the public ethos of political conduct. Personal relationships also made this unitary system function. In particular, the role of William I as a catalyst and mediator between Moltke and Bismarck is too often neglected. Both of these strong-willed men held their monarch in genuine respect and affection, however often they might confide their irritation to diaries and subordinates. Apart from his key constitutional role. William was a necessary lightning rod who understood his role and played it at least as effectively as his ministers and generals played theirs. Eighty percent of the air we breathe is an inert gas. A more dynamic figure as head of Prussia and Germany might -indeed almost certainly would -have overloaded an already highly-stressed situation 67 . The death of the aged Kaiser in 1888, the retirement of Moltke and the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, drastically altered the dynamics of Imperial Germany's policy formation. By this time Germany was moving in the direction of what Snyder calls a cartelized system -a plural society dominated by an increasing number of increasingly -powerful interest groups. Far from being privatized, these emerging cartels tended to be too public-minded for the public good. They identified their interests with those of the state to the point where the government was constrained to spend an increasing amount of its time in brokering competing positions 68 . The problem was made even more acute by the increasing strength of a Social Democratic movement that challenged from principle not merely the Empire's policies but its very legitimacy through its own institutions, the press, and the parliament 69 . Cartelization reshaped as well the structures directly responsible for shaping the policies of grand strategy. Enough has been written about the failures of William II as a head of state. Perhaps too much intellectual energy has been expended on his shortcomings. William had a quick, facile intelligence accompanied by good will -a desire to do what was best for his country and his people. He lacked both Frederick's genius and his grandfather's sense of his own limitations 70 . But it was not impossible, given Germany's constitutional structure, to compensate for these kinds of short comings in a Kaiser. Instead, the dichotomy between soldiers and diplomats, nurtured for decades by Moltke and Bismarck, deepened as the army and the Foreign Office fell victims to the effects of cartelization and pluralism. In particular the German Foreign Office under William II was increasingly characterized by loss of grip. The Prussian heritage had shown that the foreign policy of a central European State with Prussia's relative weaknesses was most effective when conducted for clear political ends. The geometric expansion of Germany's economic and commercial power was unaccompanied by a clear diplomatic focus. Her aims seemed correspondingly ambitious, and correspondingly dangerous. The Kaiser's rhetoric of the coming »German century« was underwritten by a share of the world's manufacturing higher than Britain's, and two and a half times greater than that of France. Germany's literacy rate approached a hundred percent. Its eductional system and technical training institutes produced engineers and scholars who further fostered growth. Even German agriculture was so effecient that its increasing subsidation did no harm to the economic balance 71 .
Given the Prussian heritage of an economy focussed for military purposes, Europe's alarm was understandable, especially when this powerful state made a deliberate decision to break with its tradition. Instead of seeking collaborative diplomacy Germany, particularly under Chancellor Bernhard von Biilow, sought to be the coachman of Europe, balancing among the great powers, seeking the pivot point of stresses and confrontations. Biilow was primarily concerned with using other states, whether Britain, Russia, or Austria, as pieces on a chessboard -an attitude complicated by his tendency to back away from agreements once they neared completion 72 .
This in turn put a corresponding burden on the armed forces, particularly the army. William's well-known boast that the real balance in Europe was his two dozen army corps and he shit on everything else, had by the turn of the century become an unspoken axiom of foreign policy planning. One key difference, however, lay between Bismarck's approach and that of Bülow and his successors. The latter unquestioningly accepted the German army as competent by definition. The soldiers could do anything. Just ask them, and they would affirm the fact -at least for public consumption 73 .
This assumption was particularly dangerous because Germany, for all its theoretical power, was not strong enough to afford waste motion in playing the position she sought to assume on the continent and, arguably at least, in the world. By this time virtually no coordination existed anywhere in the Reich. The Kaiser was reclutant to abandon his command power; keeping his military, diplomatic and economic agencies divided was one of the surest ways of feeding the imperial ego 74 . Related to this was a growing pattern of Ressortegoismus among the agencies directly involved. Growing inter-service rivalries between the army and the fleet, to cite only the most obvious example, made virtually impossible coordinated planning even at tactical levels. A contrast greater than that between British fears of invasion and German plans for combined operations is difficult to imagine. Neither Schlieffen nor Moltke the Younger discussed with Tirpitz the prospect of German naval action against British troop movements to the continent, to say nothing of considering a joint invasion plan for the British Isles 75 . Germany's federal constitution made tension between national and state, particularly Prussian, bureaucracies, at least as endemic. Nor had Germany's defense industries developed anything like the symbiotic relationships with their government that would become characteristic of other countries in later years 76 .
None of these rivalries were so deep that they were ultimately impossible to overcome. Rather it was not seen as necessary to overcome them. Germany's military establishment, the army in particular, was to function as the deus ex machina, making comprehensive preparations for a long war unnecessary by winning a short one. From its early status as a national symbol faute de mieux, the army was becoming a national hope -just at the time the power of Germany's enemies was expanding beyond the Reich's ability and will to compete. The enlarging of the Royal Navy, the harnessing of Russia's immense potential, the rejuvenation of the French army -coping with such an objective imbalance required the kind of total mobilization regarded as self-defeating militarily and socially by most of the military professionals, and impossible to put through the Reichstag in even the uneasy peace of the fin de siècle 77 . Any particular doubts on that subject had been settled in 1904-05. The German army had considered the Japanese as protégés ever since they had turned so decisively to German models in the 1870's. Japanese soldiers appeared to German officers as the natural epitome of that martial spirit the Germans had to cultivate in barracks. Certainly no German mother committed suicide should her son be declared unfit for active service! More than any power in the world Japan had prepared and fought the kind of war Germany expected. The first strike, the initial victories, the limited political objectives -all were present. Yet Russia, like the giant Antaeus, drew strength from defeat. For all their public posturings over the disgrace inflicted on her at Portsmouth, Japan's rulers were well aware that her depots and her treasury alike were near empty, her warships worn out from continuous service, even her generals beginning to question the endless casualty lists 78 .
Such facts stood as sharp reminders to a Germany that wished to be at the center of Europe's affairs, but whose hegemonial ambitions were confined to rhetoric. At the same time they highlighted the risks involved in another fact. Bismarck's epigoni were less and less able to sustain the Reich's diplomatic position, much less enhance it. The Franco-Russian alliance, the shattering of Holstein's hopes for a British connection, Bülow's ill-advised Weltpolitik and ill-executed hopes for a continental coalition, Bethmann's halfhearted negotiations for a naval treaty -all were milestones in the transformation of Einkreisung from the vague nightmare of 1890 to the grim reality of 1909. Germany's diplomats and Germany's leaders were alike inexperienced in the nuances of world power politics. Theirs was the heritage of Prussia, a regional power with limited interests beyond Germany and Poland. Germany had neither treaty rights nor historical presence to support too many of her claims. Nor did she have statesmen able to play second-best hands into winners at an international poker table against reasonably-competent rivals holding better cards 79 .
Germany's grand-strategic position might well, indeed, have called for a bit more militarism on the part of her armed forces. The can-do, limited-focus approach of the generals invited accepting Germany's deteriorating international position, ultimately defined by civil political authority, as a given. Gunther Rothenberg has observed that an admission that Germany's strategic position had become excessively risky would have required the army to challenge decisively its own role in the Empire -to say nothing of the fact that marshals' batons are seldom won by refusing opportunities 80 . Yet even Clausewitz insisted that governments must not ask soldiers to do the impossible. For civil courage of such order, the Imperial army substituted professionalism. From Frederick to Moltke, German soldiers had accurately stressed the importance of tactical and operational execution in implementing grand strategy. What began as a principle became an obsession. Alfred von Waldersee, Moltke's short-term successor, so often exoriated as a political general, at least had some sense of the need to reknit the links among army, administration, and economy. His successor, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, grew ever more obsessed with processes, methods, techniques. Well before his retirement in 1905 critics accused him of fostering a push-button, cookbook approach to strategic planning. The Schlieffen Plan had no room for friction. Even to its supporters the plan required everything at all levels to go preternaturally right for any chance of success. Schlieffen saw this perfection as a requirement. He is open to the charge of wishful thinking: of allowing the necessary to become the possible. But more clearly even than Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen recognized the potential threats of a drawn-out war, not merely for Germany but for Europe as a whole. In such circumstances anything detracting from the ideal of a Frederician victory represented a waste of resources Germany could not afford. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger shared Schlieffen's vision and refined it by his clearer perception that non-military factors increasingly had the potential to influence operational conduct. Was it possible, for example, simply to abandon East Prussia to a Russian invasion for the sake of over-running France? What if instead of standing in place or attacking, the French simply withdrew? Even in military terms, too many problems remained unaddressed. What about the logistics of operating in an enemy country? What about force ratios and replacements? Schlieffen had the uncomfortable habit, particularly in his later years, of assuming divisions and army corps would emerge as needed, like warriors from the dragons' teeth sowed by Cadmus 81 . These and related issues should act as a warning against exaggerating the dichotomy suggested by Michael Geyer and developed by Stig Förster, between a General Staff wanting the largest possible army and a War Ministry favoring quality, largely for social reasons 82 . Advocates of personnel-intensive and material-intensive armament shared a common goal: controlling war as far as possible. From Germany's perspective that control increasingly focussed on time rather than intensity, and required forces both as large and as efficient as possible. The military parties to the debate recognized that technology still could not completely compensate for numbers 83 . They also recognized that professionally-suitable candidates for regular commissions were not exactly besieging regiments and training schools. Numbers were certainly there. Bavaria, by 1913, had as many as five applicants for one vacancy 84 . But warm and willing bodies did not make officers. The German army historically laid great worth on what it called »character« -a set of intangibles having far more to do with attitude than birth or education. Recent French and Russian experiences seemed suggestive. A Third Republic increasingly concerned with »democratizing« its officer corps had by 1912 instead managed only to lower its intellectual level. A Russian Empire which expanded its officer corps after the debacle of 1905 found itself with too many man who knew how to wear shoulder-straps, but not what they really meant 85 . Germany's high literacy rates and her expanding economy added negative factors to officer procurement. Bright young men had far too many career opportunities more attractive than a quarter-century of supervising company drill and inspecting blistered feet -particularly given the salaries and pensions the Reichstag was likely to authorize. Jehuda Wallach's perceptive book The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation slights by omission and emphasizes by its title the fact that the Imperial army's approach to war in 1914 remained essentially Prussian. Battles of annihilation were not preludes to wars of annihilation. Instead they were the necessary antecedents of a negotiated peace. German plans for the operational conduct of war in 1914 were less incoherent than is sometimes assumed. Even the invasion of Belgium, which came as no surprise to general staffs and shocked statesmen primarily for publicity purposes, was not an automatic trigger of a European holocaust. In 1911, British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, one of Europe's leading Teutonophobes, mused that if the Germans limited their move through Belgium to the southern provinces, the latter country might decide either not to resist at all, or offer no more than a baroud d'honneur without appealing for outside assistance. And as late as August 3, 1914 , one Liberal MP openly declared he was unprepared to support a European war because of a few German regiments in a corner of Belgian territory 86 . In German terms, however, the hotly-debated postwar issues of why decisive victory eluded the army in the field, and whether it might have been won by better planning or harder fighting, overlook the real question. What was the war about? What were its goals? From Frederick to Bismarck, Prussian grand strategy had been must successful when it accepted the axiom that victory depends on a definition of aims. Germany's behavior in 1914 has been described in terms ranging from a deliberate war for hegemony, through a calculated risk, to a leap in the dark. But however malevolent the Reich's diplomatic intentions, they were for all practical purposes unaccompanied by preparations for utilizing the victories the government expected the army to win. Bethmann-Hollweg's September Program of 1914 was less the product of reasoned consideration than an Eintopfgericht made up of low common denominators -the product of a domestic system of cartel politics based on the logrolling of special interests, combined with a solid, if general, sense that war for the restoration of the status quo ante bellum made no sense, if only because that status quo started the war in the first place 87 . Erich von Falkenhayn sarcastically noted that when Schlieffen's notes no longer helped, Moltke's wits came to an end 88 , but the feckless Chief of Staff lasted several weeks longer than Bethmann and his colleagues. The statesmen expected to engage their wits once the soldiers had demonstrated theirs. By October 1914, both halves of the team had reached the end of their respective ropes. Since 1871 German grand strategy had increasingly replaced planning with rhetoric, the intoxicating talk of remapping the globe and inheriting the legacy of a declining Britain. Two months after the shooting began, such rhetoric was well on its way to that airy empire of dreams Heinrich Heine had once described as the true locus of German diplomacy. The new tones were of maintaining position, of securities, guarantees, negotiations 89 . Yet at the same time the definitions of »limitation« were beginning to change. King Albert's proud boast that Belgium was a nation, not a highway, was one side of that coin. The other was that at their minimum, Germany's war aims as they evolved in the fall of 1914 meant Belgium's termination as an independent state 90 . Apart from the objective interests of France and Britain in the issue, this represented a departure in essence from the kinds of boundarymoving from which Prussia had grown great. Particularly as the Entente recovered from the multiple shocks of its near-disaster, two ways to peace seemed open. One was the Frederician/Bismarckian pattern of negotiating with one's rivals on a limited basis. Here, for a time at least, the old relationship between battle and diplomacy seemed susceptible of restoration. In the aftermath of the crushing victories of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, Bethmann and Falkenhayn, Moltke's successor as Chief of Staff, were increasingly receptive to the possibility of concluding peace with Russia. The operational architects of these victories, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, were as committed as Moltke the Elder had ever been to knocking Russia out of the war, even if only for the instrumental purpose of dealing with her western allies. But what one body of opinion saw as an end became for the other a means, with the result that no consistent approach could be developed or executed. Germany's Russian policy was further handicapped by Entente promises. With the troops of the Central Powers deep in Russian territory by mid-1915, any peace was likely to leave Russia at a significant disadvantage. Apart from the growing assertiveness of pan-Germans and imperialists, German casualty lists were by this time too high to make a restoration of prewar circumstances acceptable even in a semi-parliamentary state. France and Britain, on the other hand, themselves acting from desperation, promised the moon to a Tsarist regime itself by no means exactly sure why it had gone to war in the first place. A strong government with significant popular support might have been willing and able to cut its losses. Russia by 1915 was in the position of a gambler seeking to recoup a modest initial risk by doubling the stakes after each loss. One cannot speak of the failure of negotiations in 1915, but rather of their failure even to get off the ground of mutually-exaggerated expectations 91 . This left Hindenburg and Ludendorff the winners by default, and put Germany in the position of fighting just the kind of war her planners had for two centuries denied she had much chance of winning. Yet particularly after the fiasco of Verdun, Hindenburg as Chief of Staff and Ludendorff as Quartermaster General began reviving other, less fortunate traditions. The dichotomous relationship between soldiers and statesmen established by Bismarck and Moltke called for a pivot figure who could claim to be above everyday frictions and tensions. By 1916, with the Kaiser totally discredited in that role, Hindenburg had become de facto Emperor of Germany. The balance was disturbed even further when the political system failed to produce anything remotely resembling a civilian rival to Falkenhayn, let alone his far more formidable successors. This owed something to the stresses of total war, and more to the army's strong position in German society. But it also reflected two other facts. Rivalry among the political parties had by this time created a situation of crabs in a bucket: as soon as one reached the top, the rest conspired to pull him down. Hertling, Erzberger, Michaelis -the list is long, if not exactly endless 92 . The problem was compounded by the infighting among the Social Democrats, who incorporated a high proportion of Germany's political talent, and dissipated it in an increasingly-bitter party struggle that in 1916 led to a complete split 93 .
Perhaps as much to the point, Germany might not be winning the war but neither was she obviously losing it. Her armies stood deep in enemy territory. Her navy's propaganda machine had converted Jutland from a drawn battle to at least a symbolic victory. Germany had suffered nothing like the adjustment shocks of Britain, the casualties of France, the territorial losses of Russia. On balance there seemed no reason why the statesmen should not follow the traditions of two centuries, and wait for the soldiers to give them that series of decisive victories that was the historical precondition to negotiations. Unfortunately for this line of reasoning, the soldiers had their own problems. The Hindenburg/Ludendorff team inherited the wrong war under all the wrong circumstances. The army's failure against Verdun illustrated the bankruptcy of Falkenhayn's »strategy« of attritionan approach which before 1914 no responsible German military thinker had considered. Yet even outside the context of Verdun Germany's most pressing problems had become not strategic but tactical, and not offensive but defensive 94 . Most images of World War I, even the German ones, deal with the horrors of attacking: machine guns, barbed wire, mud, all the rest of a familiar litany. Yet even the abortive French and British offensives of 1915 tested Germans severely, while the fighting on the Somme and in front of Arras proved the graveyard of the pre-war-trained cadres on whom the army so relied. Replacement depots emptied and morale slackened -not least because of the growing credibility of Marxist anti-war propaganda among the rank and file 95 .
In this context the new team defined two major tasks. One was overhauling tactical doctrines. The elastic defense that cost so many allied lives in 1917/18 was a triumph of the German army's institutional flexibility. So were the revised offensive tactics of 1918 that broke open every front against which they were applied. An equal triumph in its way was the High Command's success in orchestrating public concentration behind the war effort. At least since Moltke, Germany's military planners had been conditioned to fight a war of scarcity. Apart from the obvious imbalance of resources compared with her likely adversaries, the heavily professionalized German army of 1914 had little confidence in the power and the will of either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat to endure war's strains for long. Instead, trades unions and industrialists alike accepted an arms program so comprehensive as to be impossible to execute. They accepted the growing militarization of everyday life. They accepted the starvation of their women and children in the Hunger Winter of 1916/17 % . Germany's energy had been focussed into its army in ways unknown since the Seven Years' War. Prussia's and Germany's generals had never seen war as an offense to human nature. It was rather an activity as natural as eating or mating. But the activity was taking on a life of its own. It was becoming independent in a way alien to the German tradition -a way that could be simultaneously frightening and appealing. The front-line German soldier of the war's last years was not the man who had marched away in 1914 with a flower in his buttonhole. Neither his image nor his self-image was that of a peasant in uniform. What he had become was best depicted by Ernst Jünger and Otto Dix: the man of asphalt, a cigarette butt in his mouth, a grenade thrust into his belt, cradling one of the new submachine guns with the ease of familiarity 97 .
Relative to its enemies, the German army's »fighting power« unit for unit was arguably greater in 1916-1917 than at any other time in its history. The generals and the statesmen alike, however, failed to see that fighting power as a means to an end. At the start of 1918 Germany still had the option of seeking a negotiated victory by offering to end the submarine campaign and withdraw from all or part of her conquests in the west. This would put the burden of initiative on the western allies: seek the bargaining table or risk a reptition of the slaughters of 1917. It would buy Germany time to consolidate both its eastern conquests and a home front by this time showing clear signs of strain 98 . The failure to consider seriously, much less pursue, such a policy had much to do with America's entry into the war. Even the massive continental gains of resources and territory that accompanied Russia's collapse seemed insufficient to assure Germany's future against the developing coalition of the world's two greatest maritime powers. Both the political and the military leaders responded by expanding their strategic arms. Instead of mere incremental aggrandizement, the Second Reich now sought to consolidate eastern and central Europe into an empire that could serve as a stable base for the expected next round of conflict 99 . This may have represented the triumph of elements long present in German foreign policy. But it also conflicted with an even longer historical tradition of total war for limited aims, a tradition still dominant in German military planning. German strategy throughout the war was a strategy of increments. German technical innovations from poison gas to U-boats were used for tactical, at most operational, ends. Tactical orientation was also fostered by the local counterattacks which were such a marked element of the new defensive doctrine, and by the assault tactics developed by the storm troops, which were essentially battalionlevel operations 100 .
Ludendorff's famous aphorism of 1918 -punch a hole and let the rest follow -in a sense reflected this continued commitment in practice to waging war in a limited framework. But this kind of front-loading could be effective in the context of a general war only when accompanied by the coldly-rational foreign policy the generals themselves, with their blinkered, technical focus, had done much to make impossible. The balance of the Frederician/Bismarckian system had been destroyed; the results were as predictable as those of Vietnam a halfcentury later. And a constellation of rival states terrified by Germany's all-too-clearly-demonstrated operational military prowess was in no position to help restore the old balance, or create a new one. On the other hand, the Reichswehr also stood on new ground. The war had destroyed all but the most stubborn and the most generalized nostalgia for the Imperial system, at least in its military aspects. As they had done after 1806 and 1871, the soldiers concentrated on their mistakes. Perhaps the greatest of these mistakes emerged as the army's excessively narrow prewar definition of its role. The political traditions of the Prussian/German army now semed far too limited. Was it even possible to sustain the dichotomy established unter Moltke and Bismarck? Everywhere in Europe strategic thinking was dominated by an inversion of Clauswitz. The risks of war, particularly of a lost war, had grown so great that peace had become the conduct of war by other means. The tone of diplomatic intercourse was sharper; the level of threats was higher 103 . This in turn made the deterrent role of armed forces more important than at any time since the Renaissance. It also made the possibility of limited war for limited aims seem the kind of illusion no sensible soldier could sustain. But was limited war really an illusion? The Ludendorffs, the Bauers, even the Max Hoffmanns, with their grandiose expectations of Mitteleuropa reconstructed unter German rule after total victory, were anything but typical of the many regimental and divisional officers who were shocked by the armistice terms because they were convinced Germany could still salvage much by negotiating a compromise peace. In November 1918, Ludwig Beck, the future Chief of Staff, insisted the real problem was that nothing could be done against the »Dictator Ludendorff«, who had possessed the confidence alike of the army and the people until all was lost 104 . It is not necessary to take Beck's argument at face value to realize that many of the generation of Reichswehr officers moving into senior staff and command positions in the late 1920's were well aware of the strain that total war had put on the German people. Critics of the Dolchstoßlegende in its cruder forms said it was impossible to blame a sorely-tested people if after four years' misery and deprivation they simply lost the will to continue 105 . It was in this context that the Reichswehr coñsidered the defense of the Weimar Republic.
No one, military or civilian, seriously concerned with security issues seriously believed the Reichswehr as legally constituted could defend Germany's political interests and territorial integrity. Arguments for pacifism and passive resistance were dismissed as absurd 106 . This meant that for the first time in Prussia/Germany's history, her preparations for war were being made in the abstract, virtually uninfluenced by the kinds of day-to-day problems that had shaped the state's behavior as a major military power. Michael Geyer's thesis that modern states have a choice between rearmament -or more accurately, armament -and security has been widely praised 107 . It reflects, however, a computer-age dichotomy rather than the common sense of German policy-makers in an existing international order. In the context of international-relations models developed in Europe since the Renaissance, security and armament are symbiotes, not opposites. Strategic doctrines are developed not merely to defend a state against attempts by others to impose their wills, but also to assert a state's own position when necessary. None of Germany's neighbors demonstrated anything remotely resembling a Nietzschean willingness to break the sword. Paper was no less patient for Kellogg and Briand than it had been for Charles VI two centuries earlier. Geyer correctly establishes two alternate approaches to strategic planning that developed in the Reichswehr of the 1920's. One was a revived Volkskrieg tradition, a restoration -or perhaps a creation -of peoples' war in the most extreme form. Here the Reichswehr would be little more than a nucleus, a rallying point, for the kinds of popular forces that developed during the Freikorps era 108 . Advocates of this policy often tended to favor the concept of a quality army, mechanized as far as possible, as part of a retiarius doctrine of luring the enemy into a scorched-earth desert, then destroying him 109 . Some of these men were to be leading figures in the development of Blitzkrieg doctrine. On the whole, however, even for theorists of total war, this remedy was a temporary solution, one arguably worse than the disease. It depended on levels of social cohesion and political purpose that simply did not exist in Weimar Germany. German popular revisionism of the 1920's was essentially verbal. It involved playing soldiers on weekends, not dying for Eupen and Malmédy, or even the Polish Corridor. Even the uniformed paramilitary groups had an essentially domestic orientation 110 . The probable effects of implementing a scorched-earth program, even against a major invasion, made the concept unviable for all but the most determined bitter-enders. A second alternative fitted much more closely into the dominant Prussian tradition. With the use of force temporarily excluded for all practical purposes, military posturing of any kind only enhanced the dangers of becoming drawn into an unwinnable war. Rearmament, on the other hand, could not be undertaken in a vacuum. What was necessary was to pursue simultaneous goals: encouraging government and society to support a policy of rearmament, while at the same time maintaining détente -or at least enough of it that Germany's rivals would not be goaded into an armaments race Germany had no chance of winning. The challenge war to create an environment in which Germany would be allowed to catch up, not forced into a stern chase to nowhere. And this in turn required clear, systematic agreement on what Germany's military requirements were. Divisions between civil and military positions must be overcome -but for an entirely different set of reasons than those advocated by men dominated by images of the Befreiungskrieg.
Despite their major differences, advocates of both positions argued that the nature of modern warfare appeared to call for a reintegration of those functions separated during and after the era of Moltke and Bismarck. Most studies of this period concentrate on the tension between military and civil authorities, epitomized by Wilhelm Groener's assertion that the Reichswehr should tip the scales of domestic as well as foreign policy. More significant, however, is the growing symbiosis between military and political authorities -a symbiosis that for a time bade fair to transcend the Frederician/Bismarckian synthesis. The Reichswehr's relationships with the Foreign Office were carefully cultivated. Parliamentary deputies, even Social Democrats, found themselves receiving invitations to social functions and briefings on military problems. Business executives discussed theories of national mobilization with bright young colonels from the Truppenamt nl . None of this meant abandoning the military's professional control of warfare in favor of total national mobilization. Instead it involved extending the limits of professionalism. But to what purpose? Scorched-earth and détente alike seemed pointed to a similar end: the kind of total war Germany's grand strategy historically rejected as unacceptable, because ultimately unwinnable. Specifically as well, by the late 1920's Germany's military establishment was frustrated. Controlled rearmament through détente seemed nowhere near achieving results commensurate with any actual or prospective efforts. Appeasement, to be effective, must rest on a base of strength and confidence. Neither quality characterized the victor powers in the 1920's. The weakness of France, the financial and imperial crises of Great Britain, the political and economic instabilities of an dependent eastern Europe that had never been much more than a structure of dreams -all combined to create a generalized climate of mistrust exacerbated by Germany's increasingly-obvious determination to undo as much as possible of the military verdict of 1918 by diplomatic means 113 . The resulting policies of temporization did more to frustrate than to moderate German revisionism. Some of the unreasonable intensity with which the Wehrmacht's generals would later seek every possible opportunity to increase their forces can be traced to frustration with the endless disarmament conferences at which all the resolutions, all the speeches, all the exchanges of good will, seemed to bring the same result -not this time, not this year. Even a détente-oriented Minister of Defense like Wilhelm Groener increasingly saw no more than instrumental reasons for pursuing the policy 114 . As for the national-mobilization enthusiasts, no one seemed to be listening except the Nazis and, to a lesser extent, the Communists and their Rotkämpferbund. And they seemed determined to expend their energy in killing each other off. This kind of street brawling, with a few broken bones, some loosened teeth, and now and then a corpse or two for an orgy of mourning, was a far cry from the soldiers' dreams. They did not want to send the Brownshirts home; rather they sought to put them in army Feldgrau. The generals were not interested in destroying Germany in order to save it. Instead they wished to incorporate the enthusiasm the new parties, especially the Nazis, seemed able to generate into the framework of a military force able ultimately to restore Germany's European position by a series of policy wars in the traditions of Frederick and Bismarck -or their modern equivalent of victory by bluff, against opponents intimidated by memories of 1914-1918 115 . This midn-set owed little or nothing to Adolf Hitler. It reflected rather a growing sense within the Reichswehr that the preparations for integrated, national mobilization being made under the Republic were a one-way ticket to a dead end. Since the emergence of the modern state a significant tension has existed between the state's need to maintain effective armed forces and the risks of those forces, the ultimate repository of practical power, taking over the state. Prussia/ Germany had developed two models of coping with the problem. One was aristocratic: drawing military leaders from elements closely identified with the ruling class. The other was professional: providing rewards and activities enough within a limited sphere to keep the bulk of the officer corps either too busy for overt political activity, or willing to define that activity in the terms appropriate to an interest group among other interest groups in a plural society 116 . In the Weimar years under Hans von Seeckt, a third model had developed, synthesizing major elements of its predecessors. It viewed the military as a functional elite, guardian and guarantor of the state irrespective of its form of government 117 . The realities underlying that lofty pronouncement have been exposed too many times to require elaboration. The Reichswehr's anti-democratic orientation, its arms-length mistrust of the parliamentary system, its corresponding susceptibility to right-wing influences -all contributed significantly to the erosion and collapse of the Republic. The Reichswehr, however, remained hobbled because of the restrictions imposed by Versailles. The military was too weak in numbers and material to play an independent role, particularly in the context of the mass politicization of the early 1930's. This is best illustrated by the well-known war game conducted in December 1932, which concluded that the Reichswehr and the police together would find it impossible to maintain order should the Nazis and the Communists combine their forces against the government. The decision was too professionally embarassing to have been entirely motivated by the current political circumstances 118 . Increasingly the soldiers responded by moving away from interwar theories, instead concentrating on something more familiar: developing a combination of offensive armament and popular enthuiasm, the whole to be controlled by professionals who had learned enough from their predecessors' mistakes to win the quick battlefield victories that had eluded Germany in World War I 119 . A key figure here was Colonel-General Ludwig Beck. Appointed Chief of what amounted to a revivified General Staff in October 1933, he was a determined advocate of rapid, massive rearmament -rearmament, moreover, with an offensive emphasis. Beck may not have seen the potential of armored warfare as clearly as Heinz Guderian, but he quickly perceived its advantages for carrying the war to the enemy's territory. This specific ability was an important aspect of successful détente in any climate, but particularly that of the jittery 1930's. It was an even more preferable alternative to the scorched-earth policies debated in the middle 1920's. All that would be needed were statesmen able to utilize the instrument as Bismarck had done seventy-five years earlier -only this time paying closer attention to the advice of their generals 120 .
Germany's generals may not have dreamed of conquering the world, or even the continent. There is, however, no doubt of their desire to redraw Europe's map to Germany's advantage. Their concept of security was correspondingly unilateral, and depended on fighting as far as possible on other states' territory. Here they shared a value system, if not quite universal, among major military systems. More specifically, the General Staff's attitude to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other central European successor states of Versailles was Frederician. Frontiers in this area were elastic, to be adjusted as the interests and capacities of the great power dictated. Where France and Britain were concerned, neither generals nor admirals had learned much since the days of Moltke and Bismarck. If Ludwig Beck was not an implacable revanchist, there is little doubt that he saw Franco-German relations in terms of a traditional great-power rivalry in which military force was an ultimate, if not inevitable, arbiter. Admirals Raeder and Dönitz were alike increasingly obsessed with reissuing Tirpitz's challenge to British naval power, be it on the sea or under it 121 .
It was in precisely these contexts that Hitler's apparent approach to war and diplomacy appealed to Germany's senior officers. Indeed, the Wehrmacht might be said to have created a Hitler in its image, projecting onto him the military's own beliefs on the subject of national interest and national security. Hitler had described the Third Reich as resting on »two pillars,« the army and the party. The German military responded by assigning to the Nazi leader the role once exercised by Bismarck, and the diplomatic half of the job done by Frederick the Great. At least in the minds of the generals, the Führer would establish the political climate; the Wehrmacht would run the wars -and in the aftermath of victory, teach the »Bohemian corporal« some badly-needed manners 122 .
Recent research into the genesis of blitzkrieg has not quite succeeded in demonstrating it as the pure product of serendipity -a process whose best analogy would be putting the components of a watch into a bucket, shaking them for an hour or so, and expecting to pull forth a working timepiece. But if lightning war was something less than a deliberate response to Nazi Germany's economic and strategic needs, it was also something more than a fortuitous continuation of hardware, ideas, and experience. The German way of war as presented in 1939/41 fit into a pattern two centuries old -of winning quick victories by any means possible before the weight of its enemies could be brought to play, and before its society could self-destruct under the strain of attritional war 123 . It is risky to confuse the Nazi goal of total mobilization with acceptance of total war as an ideal, particularly total war on the attritional model. Hitler's intentions incorporated an eventual major war of conquest which would probably include not only Britain, but the United States as well. Yet in practice the Nazi leader's clock stood perpetually at five minutes to midnight. He was as conscious of his growing physical decline as he was convinced that only he could lead Germany to victory. As the Munich crisis of 1938 indicated, plans for the long term did not exclude utilizing short-term opportunities, even against the advice of his generals 124 . The military's mind-set can usefully be applied to help reconcile a wider debate on the nature of Nazi Germany's war economy. The thesis, most closely associated with Alan Milward, that the Third Reich deliberately armed »in breadth« the better to conduct short, decisive campaigns has recently been challenged by an alternative line of argument 125 . Wilhelm Deist, Richard Overy, and Williamson Murray describe a Reich that sought during the 1930's to prepare for total war, but persistently thwarted itself by internal conflicts over policies and resource allocation. In this context the armed forces became culpable because of their unwillingness to perceive or accept economic limits, and their continued greed for hardware. A new breed of generals was emerging -uniformed children let loose in a candy store after years of perceived deprivation accompanied by dreams of what they could achieve if only they had the money and the material. The predictable result of a dangerously-overheated economy only put more and more power into a political leadership whose ultimate ends were open-ended in a way inconceivable to the armed forces 126 .
Similar strictures are applied to the other services as well. The Luftwaffe's traditional image as a force consciously tailored to army requirements has been significantly modified. Current scholarship stresses the commitment of air force leaders to an independent role featuring strategic bombing. It also emphasizes their incapacity to think in strategic and grandstrategic terms, their inability to focus on the realities of total war between industrial nations 127 . The Kriegsmarine too stands condemned for its belief that strategic goals could be attained by tactical or technological quick fixes, whether Norwegian bases or improved operational control of U-boats 128 . What contemporary hindsight dismisses as lack of vision had other, more basic roots. Refusal to equate unlimited rearmament with unlimited war reflected the fact that the self-image of the Prussian/German military resembled a Formula One racing car rather than a pickup truck. Overheating, exhaustion, attrition -these were not likely to become problems if the initial task was properly performed. To the extent that the Wehrmacht accepted the concept of total war, it was total war of the kind intended in 1914: war waged in a limited time frame for limited purposes. The Prussian/German tradition from Frederick to Bismarck correspondingly encouraged the soldiers to depend on the statesmen to set the parameters of military operations. The challenge to this principle under William II and its violation during the First World War had produced the kind of unmitigated disaster that encouraged precipitate withdrawal into Nur-Soldatentum, particularly as the Nazis strengthened their control over the military after 1938. More serious than any alleged absence of insight into the nature of total war was the Wehrmacht's consistens failure to develop a workable high command structure. This too reflected traditions. The arme bitterly resented anything that might interfere with its winning quick victories by forcing the slightest sacrifice of its autonomy. Raeder, like Tirpitz, saw a powerful surface fleet as a Ding an sich, and correspondingly neglected the basis for any alternative forms of naval warfare. The Luftwaffe, Germany's newest service, was in large part a political instrument, a deterrent and intimidator whose rhetoric of taking the war to the enemy's factories and civilians never translated into doctrine or aircraft. Nor did the personality of Hitler or the ideology of National Socialism encourage integrated planning 129 . Neither the successes of the Norwegian campaign nor the failures in the Mediterranean convinced men in different-colored uniforms of the value of inter-service cooperation 130 . An even more basic reason for failing to develop an integrated organization for the conduct of a long war was that Germany was winning all the short ones. Between 1938 and 1941 the Third Reich engaged a series of triumphs which, far from challenging German grandstrategic traditions, appeared to fulfil them. Germany by 1939 was far more isolated than she had been in 1914, and far weaker relative to her likely adversaries 131 . Both facts, however, seemed irrelevant in the context of the Wehrmacht's fighting power and the Führer's skill at negotiation -a classic Prussian/German combination. Poland's disappearance from Europe's map was as much a diplomatic triumph -the Nazi-Soviet Pact -as a result of the blitzkrieg. The collapse of France in 1940 was at least on the surface a »Moltkean« victory, fulfilling all the major conditions established by the great Chief of Staff. Hitler's functioning as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht as well as head of state had as yet not generated friction beyond the scale experienced in 1870/71 -the sort to be expected in any complex set of relationships. The defeat of the French army was followed by peace concluded with a competent and legitimate government, one at least prepared, if not anxious, to cooperate with the new European order. Belgium and Denmark followed similar patterns, and there was no inevitable reason the monarchs of Norway and Holland should not eventually have joined that long'list of rulers vainly dreaming of restoration as their countries proceeded without them 132 .
By the summer of 1940, in short, Hitler might well be assumed to have fulfilled in fact the Frederician/Bismarckian role in Germany's grand strategy assigned him by the military. The difference lay in the ideology and aims of National socialism. The vagueness of German strategy in 1940/41 reflected the crucial paradox of Hitler's foreign policy. His ideologically-fuelled dreams of global empire were accompanied by an almost superstitious belief in the power of negotiations. He expected to achieve his ends by treaties as well as conquests. When his peace feelers to and his threats against Great Britain in the summer of 1940 were rejected the Führer found himself, as had Frederick in 1759, stuck in a war with no exit 133 . This point was first clearly indicated in the Battle of Britain. Göring's approach in 1940 replicated Ludendorff's in 1918: make a hole and the rest will follow. When it did not, Germany stood helpless 134 . In the Mediterranean as well, German strategy lacked a focus. Denied quick victory, except in the most limited tactical sense, the Wehrmacht drifted through a series of essentially aimless combats 135 . Negotiations with Stalin for the division of power in eastern Europe were a pathetic mismatch. Hitler's aims of Russo-German collaboration, possibly to the point of a continental coalition against Britain, harked back to Holstein and Bülow.
They also caused great amusement in the Kremlin. Even in the aftermath of the purges, the Nazi diplomats were amateurs playing against professionals 136 . It is small wonder that Hitler and his advisors increasingly accepted the idea of military action as a means of gaining with the sword what they saw no hope of achieving with the pen. In addition to ideologically and ethnically-based contempt for the Russian people and their form of government, the Wehrmacht was suffering from an acute case of victory disease. In hindsight the optimism seems hollow, based on a set of if/then calculations reflecting a combination of wishful thinking and culpable ignorance of both the Red Army's qualities and Soviet military potential 137 . German confidence in part reflected the fact that to date officers and men, doctrines and equipment, had alike performed far beyond the most optimistic prewar expectations. But the Wehrmacht's attitude also fit the pattern of Prussia/ Germany's approach to grand strategy. However confused the planning for Operation Barbarossa, it did have a common denominator. Hitler and his generals planned what amounted to a repetition on a grand scale of Frederick the Great's strategy of 1740, with White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasian oil fields playing the role assigned to Silesia two centuries earlier 138 .
As to what would happen next, no one was quite sure. Perhaps Russia west of the Urals would become something out of a Karl May novel, a wild-west proving ground for the Wehrmacht, the S.S. and the Nordic settlements dreamed of by Heinrich Himmler. Hitler's fanatical hostility to any form of Russian national government or government in exile is well established 139 . Yet the Führer also consistently spoke of concluding his eastern crusade with the »negotia-tion« of peace treaties involving a network of successor states -clients, protectorates, or puppets according, to one's perspective, but governments nevertheless 140 . Even Josef Goebbels noted that »R.
[ussia] will be divided into her constituent parts. Each republic will get a fine dose of freedom. The line is that we shall no longer tolerate a huge monolith in the East.« 141 Whether Hitler was lying, seeking to mislead, or just keeping his options open, he offered a convenient fig leaf for soldiers already too willing to look the other way. Hitler's ideologically-fuelled dreams of European conquest and world empire continued to be accompanied by a blind belief in his ability to manipulate short-term negotiations with actual or potential allies and rivals. This faith helps explain even the much-debated declaration of war on the U.S. in December 1941. Sebastian Haffner, one of the Third Reich's most sober and perceptive observers, speaks of the Führers Götterdämmerung.
Knowing the war was lost, he sought to bring all down in ruins 142 . Yet Frederick, perhaps even Bismarck, would have understood the tactic, if not necessarily its specific application. A Japanese-German alliance in the context of a shooting war ultimately seemed to improve the prospect of a temporary negotiated peace by temporarily raising the stakes for the Reich's enemies 143 . By 1942 at the latest, Germany's military leaders had abandoned any strategic concept more profound than holding out and hoping for a miracle. They recognized, however sublimiwally, the profound error they had made in projecting their own concepts of war, peace, and diplomacy onto Adolf Hitler. Rather than take the risks involved in attempting to restore the traditional symbiosis between military and political leadership, the Wehrmacht's senior officers hid behind a false professionalism. This attitude was enhanced by the function of the marshals' own complicity in a Third Reich whose criminal nature became daily more apparent. Yet to recognize this fact meant either to act against the regime, or to admit the concepts of honor and service around which one's life had ostensibly been built were no more than empty words. It was easier by far to take Hitler's medals and Hitler's money, and turn the other way 144 .
So Hitler, like Ludendorff before him, fought his own version of a total war in a limited framework. To the end he expected that someone, from somewhere, would negotiate the kind of peace that brought Prussia to great-power status under Frederick and Bismarck. In the bunker under a crumbling Berlin, he babbled of »the miracle of the House of Hohenzollern.« comparing Roosevelt's death to that of the Tsarina Elizabeth in 1763. Yet even as he lost touch with reality, in his dreams of a separate peace Hitler remained heir to part of a tradition he never understood -the Prussian/German tradition of war for limited clearly-defined objectives.
IV
This tradition survived in a German Federal Republic also concerned to limit its foreign policy and its military operations. Victory over Slavs or Communists, restoration of Bismarck's Reich, even the demonstration of soldierly virtù -such was the stuff neither of the professional press nor of late-night conversations in the bars of the officers' clubs. Enthusiasm was at a discount in the ranks of the Bundeswehr. What mattered was professionalism -the kind of professionalism that harks back to the Frederician Era in its determination to preserve the state and buy time while the politicians seek to avert thermonuclear disaster 145 . Yet perhaps an even more effective coda to Prussian/German grand strategy was written by the resistance to Adolf Hitler. As late as 1944 its military and civilian elements alike denied not the reality, but the necessity, of total war. Only remove Hitler and it would still be possible to negotiate from a rational, objective perspective, balancing the situation on the ground with the needs and prospects of a stable Europe. That Germany would somehow profit from this, if only by avoiding total defeat, was accepted. But why not? The Nazis, and certainly Hitler himself, did not represent, at least in the minds of its defenders, the »holy Germany« which Stauffenberg affirmed in his death-cry. And in any case, the bitterness had to end somewhere. A start had to be made on reconstructing relationships as well as redrawing maps 146 .
In the context of the Nazi challenge to world order and human decency, the resisters' approach to foreign policy invites dismissal as hopelessly naïve, a desperate attempt to deny the fate Germany had brought upon herself 147 . Yet nowhere was the German Resistance more »Prussian« than in its coldly rational approach to international relations. John Lewis Gaddis has recently established a binary model of grand strategy: »risk versus cost.« The poles tend towards mutual exclusivity: minimizing cost maximizes risk, and vice versa 148 . From its beginnings Prussian/German grand strategy was above all a strategy of risk. The state's ends strained the state's means to their utmost. Militarily this encouraged focussing on the quick attainment of policy goals through intense temporally-limited military action. The soldiers accurately perceived short wars as a condition not merely of victory, but of survival. They were also heirs to a tradition of military/diplomatic symbiosis in which the statesmen were responsible for setting rational limits to war's parameters. In vulgar Freudian terms the warriors were the id and the diplomats the superego; successful national policy required both. From the days of Frederick the Great, Prussia's and Germany's optimal grand strategy had been a synthesis of violence and limitation within a European and world order that was ultimately perceived as rational, if not always harmonious. The breakdown of that synthesis in World War I did not signal its disappearance. Even in Hitler's foreign policy, a policy of conquest and betrayal, vestiges of the pattern survived and misled.
Seen in this context, the German military's often-demonstrated focus on tactical and operational levels was not a failure of blinkered Fachidioten.
In war, efficiency tends to reinforce purpose. Success, above all quick success, diminishes or mutes resistance. The most noble of public causes, on the other hand, is corroded by ineffectiveness. An individual may make a Kantian commitment to a goal and accept with pride whatever consequences may result. States, on the other hand, are institutions facing an inherently impossible task: to represent the will and the welfare of a necessarily-heterogeneous population. Their governors must calculate how much can be borne in a given situation without fatally damaging the structure they seek to control and enhance. It is in this context that the balancing of relationships among means, end, and will that is the essence of strategy takes place. Ultimately, Germany was unable to prevent or retard the evolution of total war. But this failure should not obscure the fact that German military policies were not a denial of the concept of grand strategy, but rather its fulfillment -on German terms, to meet German needs. In this context at least, for all its shortcomings German strategy as it developed over two centuries reflected Clausewitz's definition of war as an act of violence to compel the enemy to do one's will. 
